Johnson Mcconnell Agreement Of 1966

In 1966, the army and air force remained in an enigma. The army was still operating fixed-wing airlift aircraft and continued an operation that had been going on since the 1920s. The Air Force plans to expand its deployment of helicopters for combat. The Interservice-Kerfuffle reached a landslide in 1962, when an army task force, known as the Howze Board, formed on the instruction of the Minister of Defence, presented a plan for the army`s new air brigades. This plan included a force of 656 AC-1 — the study name of the former de Havilland Canada Caribou, and then the C-7A. This report was not a paper study — it included dozens of field trials on real aircraft, and it produced a report about two centimetres thick. And he landed like a grenade in the office of the Chief of the Air Staff, Gen Curtis LeMay. LeMay thought that if he flew, he should belong to the Air Force – a position that Robert MacNamara rejected when the Air Force presented a counter-study, the Disoway Board. In order to offend the injury, the Disoway Board also rejected the idea of developing specific aircraft for Close Air Support and insisted that multifunction aircraft be more flexible and practical. Supported by the Minister of Defence, the army forged the 11th Air Assault Division (test) in 1963.

Not only did the army receive an additional division, but it also got permission to add 15,000 soldiers for construction. At the same time, the army pushed the air force to buy the Navy`s A-7 Corsair, which the Air Force did not want to do – it was a navy plane that could not roll over the sound. Angry, the army deployed in helicopter gunships or “air fire support.” In the eyes of the Air Force leadership, the Army rebuilt the Air Force Corps at the expense of the Air Force. In the eyes of army leaders, the air force was not sufficiently obliged to support ground troops. I think both were correct. Both were not reasonable. The agreement was not warmly welcomed by both services. Many army officers felt that the army had swapped a real and valuable capability (the Caribbean) for “empty guarantees of the status quo in helicopters.” [10] The Air Force, for its part, was now responsible for the crew and financing of an aircraft that it had long refused because it had given up on the rotating winged aircraft. If technological progress were ever to favour such aircraft, the Air Force would be in serious trouble.

[10] In 1966, the U.S. Air Force began sending CH-3 helicopters to Vietnam, with the “informal agreement” that “the Air Force would not seek to provide deliveries to the army by helicopter”[7] but “critical bottlenecks at Chinooks temporarily ended the firm rigidity of education.” [8] Air Force helicopters were deployed in a large number of tasks that required heavy helicopters beyond their intended role in the special air war. [8] The 1966 Johnson-McConnell Agreement was an agreement between General General Harold K. Johnson and the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, John P. McConnell, of April 6, 1966. The U.S. military has agreed to abandon its fixed-wing tactical airlift aircraft, while the U.S. Air Force has renounced its claims to most forms of rotary-wing aircraft. The most immediate effect was the transfer of aircraft from the DHC-4 Caribou army to the Air Force.